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Abstract 
Transnational non-state governance supplies a growing proportion of the rules and regulations that 
govern the global economy, raising pressing questions about its legitimacy. Cutting across established 
perspectives, this article adopts the empirical approach of legitimation research to explain variation in 
the choice of normative strategies to create legitimacy for private rules. To this end, it reviews existing 
explanations of institutional design in private governance research and integrates them into a common 
framework of analysis. This framework is put to work in three in-depth case studies, tracing the 
formation of multi-stakeholder governance in the field of sustainable agriculture – currently the most 
dynamic site of transnational non-state institution building. The case studies reveal that a full 
explanation of variation in the use of participation-, expert-, and procedural fairness-based strategies 
needs to consider both the internal mechanisms of institutional choice as well as differences in the 
political environments in which these choices are taken. 
Keywords 
Legitimacy, private governance, institutional design, environment, global governance 
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1. Introduction  
Transnational non-state governance supplies a growing proportion of the rules and regulations that 
govern the global economy. Today, private rule-makers set behavioural norms and standards for a 
wide range of industries and issue areas, raising pressing questions about their legitimacy. The existing 
literature on the topic falls fairly neatly into two camps: one normative, the other empirical in its 
orientation. Scholars working in the normative tradition theorize and evaluate private governance from 
the vantage point of democratic theory, in particular, deliberative democratic theory has become an 
important model (e.g., Dingwerth, 2007; Bäckstrand et al., 2010; Schouten et al., 2012). Empirically 
oriented scholars, on the other hand, define legitimacy in relational terms. From this perspective, 
legitimacy is granted or denied by an institution’s audience in a dynamic process of legitimation, and 
scholars study how private rule-makers can gain, maintain, or lose it (e.g., Cashore, 2002; Bernstein 
and Cashore, 2007; Bexell, 2014). 
While sharing a common interest in the concept of legitimacy, the normative and empirical 
literatures have developed largely in isolation from one another. To bridge this divide, Sigrid Quack 
(2010) has proposed a cross-cutting perspective, which explores the normative dimension through the 
views and strategies of real actors. Since then, some progress has been made in explaining these 
choices, but the causal mechanisms underlying them are not yet fully understood. Several authors have 
examined institutional pressures and whether or not they push private governance organizations to 
emphasize inclusiveness, expertise, and procedural fairness in their overall designs (Dingwerth and 
Pattberg, 2009; Overdevest, 2010; Fransen, 2012; Marx, 2014). Others describe how the preferences 
of institutional entrepreneurs and processes of learning and intergroup bargaining matter in these 
contexts (Auld et al., 2007; Abbott and Snidal, 2009; Conzelmann, 2012). But studies that 
systematically combine the analysis of external pressures with how institutional choices are made on 
the inside of these arrangements are still missing.  
To fill this gap, this article reviews arguments about the design of private governance and 
integrates them into a common framework of analysis. This framework is then put to work in three in-
depth case studies, tracing the formation of multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) in the field of 
sustainable agriculture – recently, the most dynamic site of non-state institution building. MSIs are 
often referred to as the gold standard of private governance. However, as this article will show, they as 
well vary greatly in the choice of costly legitimation strategies. The cases reveal that a full explanation 
of variation in the use of normative legitimation strategies needs to consider both the internal 
mechanisms of institutional choice as well as differences in the political environments in which these 
choices are taken. 
The remainder of this article is structured in five sections: the next section introduces the concept 
of legitimacy, explaining the distinction between normative and sociological approaches. This is 
followed by a brief description of the variety of private governance and legitimation strategies that 
exist in the real-world. Then, the explanatory framework is developed, followed by the case studies. A 
final section concludes.  
2. The legitimacy of private governance: two perspectives 
In their landmark study on Private Authority in International Affairs, Claire Cutler and colleagues 
(1999, p. 16) observed that “private actors are increasingly engaged in authoritative rule-making that 
was previously the prerogative of sovereign states”. These and the findings of other studies (e.g., 
Biersteker and Hall, 2002) have sparked much scholarly debate about the legitimacy of non-state 
transnational governance. As mentioned in the introduction to this article, existing studies are often 
either normative or empirical in their orientation. Buchanan and Keohane (2006, p. 405) describe the 
difference between the two as follows: to say that an institution is legitimate in the normative sense is 
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to assert that it has the right to rule. On the other hand, an institution is legitimate in the sociological 
(empirical) sense when it is widely believed to have the right to rule. The difference appears subtle at 
first, but has important implications for the type questions being asked.  
To assert that a non-state institution has the right to rule requires a normative theory of legitimate 
private rule-making. Such a theory needs to specify and justify standards against which real-world 
arrangements can be evaluated. With its focus on preference aggregation and principal-agent 
accountability, liberal democratic theory is widely considered unsuitable for this purpose. Mainly, that 
is because the transnational realm lacks a demos or principal and is characterized by a multitude of 
actors and diffuse authority structures instead (Dryzek, 2000; Dingwerth, 2007).  
In search for substitutes, scholars have proposed alternative standards for normatively evaluating 
the legitimacy of transnational governance. The three most important are: inclusiveness of 
participation, expertise-based effectiveness, and procedural fairness (Quack, 2010, p. 7). As described 
by Sigrid Quack, these concepts find some common ground with what Fritz Scharpf (1999) and Risse 
and Kleine (2007) define as input, output, and throughput legitimacy. Most influential among students 
of private governance have been input-oriented approaches, in particular, deliberative democratic 
theory (Dingwerth, 2007; Bäckstrand and Khan and Kronsell and Lövbrand, 2010; Schouten and 
Glasbergen and Leroy, 2012). In a nutshell, deliberative democrats believe that “getting the process 
right” can help to revitalize and restore democratic legitimacy (Dryzek, 2000). Strongly influenced by 
Habermas’ theory of communicative action, inclusiveness of participation is the key procedural 
criterion of the deliberative approach. It requires that all those affected by a rule are given an equal 
opportunity to participate and express their voice in the rule-making process. In addition to input-
oriented approaches, scholars have studied the output legitimacy of transnational non-state governance 
(e.g., Kalfagianni and Pattberg, 2014). This line of research suggests that the legitimacy of private 
governance organizations depends, at least partly, on their ability to provide effective solutions to 
policy problems. This problem solving capacity is often seen as a direct function of their technical, 
professional, and bureaucratic expertise. Finally, with regard to throughput, procedural fairness and 
impartiality are sometimes considered as evaluative criteria. In this context, quasi-judicial conflict 
resolution mechanisms are believed to enhance the normative legitimacy of transnational non-state 
governance (e.g. Marx, 2014). 
Empirically oriented scholars, on the other hand, are interested in the question why and when non-
state institutions are believed to have the right to rule (Cashore, 2002; Bernstein, 2011; Bexell, 2014). 
The main difference is that, from this perspective, legitimacy is defined in relational terms. It is 
granted or denied by an institution’s audience in a dynamic process of legitimation. In the words of 
Steven Bernstein (2011, p. 19): “legitimacy results from the interaction of the community of actors 
affected by the regulatory institution (…) that prevail[s] in the relevant issue area”.  
To analyse processes of legitimation in the area of private governance, Benjamin Cashore and 
collaborators (2002; 2004) draw on the work of Mark Suchman (1995) and distinguish two main types 
of legitimacy: pragmatic and moral legitimacy. Pragmatic legitimacy is based on actors’ self-interest, 
including calculations of material well-being. An institution is granted pragmatic legitimacy if it 
satisfies the substantive demands of its most immediate audiences’. The concept loosely corresponds 
to March and Olsen’s (1998) idea of legitimacy based on the “logic of consequence”. Moral 
legitimacy, on the other hand, is granted based on audiences’ more resilient normative beliefs as to 
whether supporting an institution is “the right thing to do” (Suchman, 1995, p. 579). This dimension of 
Suchman’s framework is broadly aligned with March and Olsen’s (1998) notion of the “logic of 
appropriateness”.  
In Suchman’s strategic approach – and later applications of his framework to the study of 
transnational non-state governance (Cashore, 2002; Cashore and Auld and Newsom, 2004) – 
legitimacy is seen as an organizational resource that private rule-makers can and need to manage. 
Their work has shown how the ability of private governance organizations to gain pragmatic and 
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moral legitimacy critically depends on the successful execution of legitimation strategies (Cashore, 
2002).  
Surprisingly, while sharing a common interest in the concept of legitimacy, the normative and 
sociological approaches have developed largely in isolation from one another. To bridge this divide, 
Quack (2010) has proposed a cross-cutting perspective which explores the normative dimension 
through the views and strategies of real actors. In a special issue of Socio-Economic Review, she and 
her collaborators show how transnational governance institutions vary in the degree in which they 
deploy participation-, expertise-, and/or procedural fairness-based strategies. While some progress has 
been made in understanding these institutional choices, the causal mechanisms underlying these 
decisions are not yet fully understood. The main goal of this article is to advance this research in the 
field of transnational non-state governance. To this end, the next section describes the institutional 
diversity that exists in this area. With a focus on MSIs – the gold standard of private governance – it 
then explores and compares the choice of legitimation strategies in three in-depth case studies.  
3. Varieties of private governance 
Transnational non-state governance has diffused rapidly and widely in the global economy. In areas 
such as environmental protection, labour rights, and technical standards, it now provides a rapidly 
growing proportion of the rules and regulations. As described by Abbott and Snidal (2009, p. 87): “the 
state is far from the only game in town, and may no longer be the most important game in town”. 
While the decentralized evolution of private governance makes it difficult to keep track of its numbers 
and exact configurations, existing studies allow insights into the overall trend. Using data from the 
Ecolabel Index, a database that lists over 450 voluntary sustainability standards, Axel Marx (2014, p. 
411) describes how the number of private governance initiatives in this area has increased almost nine 
fold since 1990.  
Not surprisingly, this has sparked much debate about in the legitimacy of private rule-making. 
While some scholars warn that outsourcing regulatory functions to private actors will lead to “less 
democracy and accountability around the world” (Lipschutz and Fogel, 2002, p. 121), others are more 
optimistic, seeing these new modes of governance as part of a “deliberative turn” in global 
environmental politics (Bäckstrand and Khan and Kronsell and Lövbrand, 2010). While this debate is 
unlikely to be settled anytime soon, a closer look reveals a great diversity among private governance 
organizations. On a very general, three main types can be distinguished: industry initiatives, civil 
society initiatives, and MSIs (see Table 1). 
While exact figures are hard to come by, industry initiatives clearly make up the lion’s share of 
transnational non-state governance (Abbott and Snidal, 2009). Under political pressure to make their 
value chains more responsible, big brand companies have been very active in mobilizing around 
sustainability issues and to set standards in this area. However, without meaningful participation from 
civil society and with no effective oversight from the state (often a problem in the context of 
transnational production), business self-regulation remains problematic. Most importantly, there is the 
risk of regulatory capture – that is, “the control of the regulatory process by those whom it is supposed 
to regulate” (Mattli and Woods, 2009, p. 12). While civil society initiatives are widely regarded as 
more neutral and unbiased standard-setters, they as well suffer from a lack of representativeness. As 
pointed out by Abbott and Snidal (2009: 61) NGOs often pursue their own “private values” and do not 
necessarily represent the public interest. 
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Table 1 Varieties of private governance 
Sector Industry initiatives 
 
Civil society initiatives Multi-stakeholder initiatives 
Agriculture 
 
 
 
Apparel 
 
 
 
Fishery 
 
 
 
 
Forestry 
 
 
 
Mining 
 
 
 
 
Tourism 
 
 
Energy 
  
Global G.A.P, Sustainable 
Agriculture Initiative, Field 
to Market 
 
World Responsible Apparel 
 
 
 
Global Aquaculture 
Alliance, International 
Fishmeal and Fish Oil 
Organization 
 
Programme for the 
Endorsement of Forest 
Certification 
 
International Council on 
Mining and Metals, 
Responsible Jewellery 
Council 
 
Tour Operators Initiative, 
Sustainable Slopes Program 
 
Global Sustainability 
Electricity Partnership, 
Equitable Origin 
Sustainable Agriculture 
Network, Rainforest Alliance 
 
 
Clean Cloth Campaign, 
Workers Rights Consortium, 
Good Weave International 
 
Friends of the Sea 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Travel Foundation 
 
 
Ceres Principles 
Roundtable on Sustainable 
Biomaterials, Bonsucro, 
Roundtable on Responsible Soy 
 
Fair Labor Association, Fair 
Wear Foundation 
 
 
Marine Stewardship Council, 
Aquaculture Stewardship Council 
 
 
 
Forest Stewardship Council 
 
 
 
Initiative for Responsible Mining 
Assurance 
 
 
 
Global Sustainable Tourism 
Council 
 
Hydropower Sustainability 
Assessment Protocol  
Given these problems of schemes dominated by single groups of actors, MSIs promise to hold the 
greatest potential for legitimate private rule-making – and they have been praised as “one of the most 
innovative and startling institutional designs of the past 50 years” (Cashore and Auld and Newsom, 
2004, p. 298). Their signature design feature is inclusiveness of participation. By definition, MSIs 
involve a variety of stakeholders in their governance and standard-setting activities. A prominent 
example is the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), an organization that sets global standards for 
sustainable forestry management and operates a certification system. Praised for its deliberative 
approach (e.g., Dingwerth, 2007), the FSC features three stakeholder chambers, representing 
environmental, social, and economic interest, with equal participation from organizations from the 
global north and south. Next to inclusiveness of participation, the FSC also uses expert- and 
procedural fairness-based strategies to create legitimacy for its rules. The scheme involves 
independent scientists in its standard-setting process and was one of the first private governance 
initiatives to introduce a formal dispute resolution system in 1998 (FSC, 2015).  
Over the last two decades, similar arrangements have been created in a wide range of industry 
sectors. Figure 1 illustrates the pattern of diffusion. Transnational MSIs first emerged in the forestry 
sector and then spread rapidly to other industry sectors. The population of MSIs started to increase 
towards the end of the 1990s and kept growing throughout the 2000s. Several schemes are currently in 
formation and new ones are likely to be initiated in the future. 
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Figure 1 The diffusion of transnational multi-stakeholder governance
1
 
 
The MSI model has developed into what one could call the gold standard of transnational non-state 
governance. Luc Fransen (2012) describes how the label multi-stakeholder has become for many an 
indicator of legitimacy. However, not all MSIs are the same, and scholars have repeatedly criticized 
the dominance of established stakeholder groups, a focus on selective topics and discourses, as well as 
power asymmetries between participants (Fransen and Kolk, 2007; Cheyns, 2011; Schouten and 
Glasbergen and Leroy, 2012). In their analysis of twenty-two MSIs, Fransen and Kolk, for example, 
find significant variation in their level of inclusiveness. Distinguishing between initiatives of broad 
and narrow inclusiveness, they describe how “different types of multi-stakeholder standards currently 
co-exist under one and the same flag”. They warn that “those who want to avoid difficult interactions 
with critics and true interest representation have to some extent the opportunity to do so” (Fransen and 
Kolk, 2007, pp. 669, 678-679).  
There is also evidence for variation in the use procedural fairness-based strategies. In his analysis 
of 426 voluntary sustainability standards, Marx (2014) finds that only 30 of them had clear dispute 
settlement procedures in place. While most of them are MSIs, he describes differences in design 
across schemes. For example, differences exist as to what constitutes a complaint, by whom they can 
be made, and how dispute settlement decisions are reached. Finally, the literature points to variation in 
the use of expert-based strategies. Auld and Gulbrandsen (2010), for example, describe how the 
founders of the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) put more emphasis on expert-based effectiveness, 
to compensate for a less participatory governance structure.   
In sum, while the legitimacy of MSIs is commonly considered superior to that of other types of 
private governance, they do not form a homogenous group. This is not surprising as the choice of 
legitimation strategies involves costly trade-offs. While inclusiveness of participation may bring 
                                                     
1
 This figure is based on a mapping analysis conducted by the author. It lists private standard-setting organizations that 1) 
develop social and/or environmental standards; 2) are governed by private actors; 3) have a distinct multi-stakeholder 
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legitimacy, true interest representation competes with more pragmatic objectives. In this regard, 
scholars have pointed to a negative correlation between inclusiveness and the speed of decision-
making (Auld and Gulbrandsen, 2010). In a similar way, there is an inverse relationship between 
inclusiveness and the level of control individual actors or groups of actors enjoy over the regulatory 
process and its outcomes. Given these trade-offs, institutional designers possess incentives to 
substitute true interest representation with less costly legitimation strategies. The interesting question 
is: what explains variation in these choices?  
4. The choice of legitimation strategies in non-state transnational governance: a 
framework for analysis  
There are several studies that analyse the creation and evolution of non-state transnational governance. 
Reviewing this literature, three mechanisms of institutional choice can be identified: institutional 
pressures, institutional entrepreneurs, and intergroup bargaining. In the following, each mechanism 
will be described briefly.  
4.1 Institutional pressures  
A central argument in institutional theory is that organizational forms are shaped by the political and 
cultural environments in which they are embedded (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Coercive, mimetic, 
and normative institutional pressures are believed to make organizations become more similar 
(isomorphic) over time. Dingwerth and Pattberg (2009) have made this argument for the field of 
transnational sustainability governance. They describe how private rule-making organizations came to 
share a set of costly core features (stakeholder councils, process rhetoric, and participatory elements). 
They explain these similarities with the evolution of an organizational field in this area, resulting in 
strong coercive, mimetic, and normative pressures on its members (Dingwerth and Pattberg, 2009, pp. 
722-731). A related argument has been made by Christine Overdevest (2010), who describes how 
public comparison and benchmarking have led to convergence among private governance 
organizations in the forestry arena. While institutional pressures may have led to convergence in some 
cases, the isomorphism argument struggles to account for the persistence of variation described in the 
previous section (see also Auld and Gulbrandsen, 2013). There are two possible explanations for this. 
One is that isomorphic pressures are not as strong as Dingwerth and Pattberg suggest. In addition, they 
may vary in strength, resulting in convergence in some areas but not in others (Fransen, 2011). The 
second explanation points to factors that are internal to private governance organizations. In this 
regard, Luc Fransen (2012) argues that private governance decision-makers maintain room to 
manoeuvre. Often, they would only partially conform to established norms of good governance, as 
they have to balance conflicting institutional pressures. The question that arises is how these decisions 
are made? Here, the literature points to two mechanisms: the preferences of institutional entrepreneurs 
and intergroup bargaining.  
4.2 Institutional entrepreneurs  
Institutional entrepreneurs have been defined as actors “who have an interest in a particular 
institutional arrangement and who leverage resources to create new ones or change existing ones” 
(DiMaggio, 1988; Maguire et al., 2004, p. 657). Several authors in the private governance literature 
have made use of this concept (Auld and Balboa and Bartley and Cashore and Levin, 2007; Bartley, 
2007; Auld and Gulbrandsen, 2013). Institutional entrepreneurs are believed to play an important role 
in the supply of private governance organizations. When new arrangements are created, these focal 
actors do much of the “leg work”. They set agendas, provide leadership, mobilize resources, and act as 
gate keepers. However, their preferences and institutional choices can vary, due to a range of factors. 
One is their perception of the environment in which they operate and, depending on that, how they 
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decide to balance different institutional pressures. Secondly, learning or selective mimicry is thought 
to play an important role in these situations (Auld and Gulbrandsen, 2013). Institutional entrepreneurs 
and their choices are often informed by the lessons they draw from their experiences and the 
experiences of others. Depending on the type of lessons they draw, they can be a force behind 
convergence, but also divergence is possible and has been observed. For example, Auld et al. (2007, p. 
25) describe how, learning from the FSC, the founders of the MSC decided against the “psychotic 
democracy” of the forestry initiative in order to become a market mechanism faster.  
4.3 Intergroup bargaining 
The third mechanism is intergroup bargaining. From this perspective, organizations are seen as 
inherently political arenas in which struggles over influence and diverging interests take place (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1977). In the private governance literature, several authors have described processes of 
intergroup bargaining in connection with questions of institutional design (Abbott and Snidal, 2009; 
Conzelmann, 2012). Studying the proliferation of regulatory standard-setting institutions, Abbott and 
Snidal describe differences in the preferences of firms, NGOs, and states actors (as well as diversity 
within these groups). When new regulatory arrangements are created they often bargain explicitly with 
one another. Intergroup bargaining is thought to be particularly intense in the context of MSIs, as firms 
and NGOs often differ sharply over the structure and governance of schemes as well as the design of 
standards and procedures. The result is a “bargaining game” in which the distribution of bargaining 
power determines whose preferences prevail and which institutional outcomes are selected (Abbott 
and Snidal, 2009, pp. 72-82). Abbott and Snidal distinguish two principal forms of bargaining power 
in these situations: “go-it-alone-power” (GIAP) and “inclusion power”. GIAP refers to the ability of 
actors to meet some or all of their goals unilaterally. Thus, GIAP creates an “outside option” for 
independent action. On the other hand, inclusion power creates an “inside option” for participation in 
MSIs. Actors possess inclusion power when they possess competencies or resources which others need 
in order to achieve their objectives.  
This section identified three mechanisms thought to influence the choice of legitimation strategies 
in non-state transnational governance. One way to organize them is to distinguish between internal and 
external mechanisms. The external mechanism is institutional pressures. They can be weak or strong 
and vary across sectors and issue areas. The internal mechanisms are the preferences of institutional 
entrepreneurs and intergroup bargaining. In addition, one can identify a loose sequence between the 
internal mechanisms. While institutional entrepreneurs (programme founders) are most influential in 
the early stages of the design process, intergroup bargaining becomes more important as organizations 
develop and more actors with diverging interests become involved. The three mechanisms do not 
constitute competing explanations, but are likely to interact in complex ways. Figure 2 provides a 
framework for analysis.  
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Figure 2 Framework to analyse the choice of legitimation strategies in transnational non-state 
governance 
 
Existing studies of the design of private governance have mostly focused on single mechanisms – 
often taking an internal (e.g., Conzelmann, 2012) or external perspective (e.g., Dingwerth and 
Pattberg, 2009). In contrast, an integrated analysis of multiple factors and how they interact across 
levels is still missing. To fill the gap, this study explores the choice of legitimation strategies in the 
field of sustainable agriculture. In recent years, the agro-food sector has evolved into the most 
dynamic site of multi-stakeholder governance, with many new initiatives being created since the mid-
2000s (see Figure 1). This makes agriculture an interesting case to study. Unlike the well-established 
MSIs in in the forestry, fishery, and apparel sectors, the “traces” in agriculture are still fresh. This 
allows for a more in-depth analysis of the choices taken and the dynamics driving these decisions.  
Informed by the framework developed above, the case studies that follow trace and compare the 
design process of three major agro MSIs. The analysis draws on over fifty semi-structured interviews 
conducted with private governance managers and representatives from firms, NGOs, and state 
agencies. These interviews were conducted between 2011 and 2014 as part of a doctoral dissertation 
(Schleifer, 2014). The information obtained through the interviews was triangulated with meeting 
minutes, information provided on websites, as well as media reports.  
5. Multi-stakeholder governance for sustainable agriculture 
At the beginning of the 21
st
 century, the agro-food system is characterized by a complex set of 
environmental and social problems. Major environmental challenges are deforestation, soil 
degradation, and biodiversity loss. Pressing social problems include food insecurity, poor labour 
standards, and foreign land acquisitions (Clapp, 2012). Many of these problems cross international 
borders and private governance institutions are being developed to mitigate these problems. While 
different types of private governance exist in the agriculture sector, MSIs make up an important 
proportion. In particular, the 2000s saw a wave of new MSIs being created in sectors like beef, 
biofuels, cocoa, coffee, cotton, tea, palm oil, soy, and sugarcane (Schleifer, 2014). To gain a better 
understanding of the choice of legitimation strategies in these contexts, the following analysis focuses 
on the creation of three major initiatives: the Roundtable on Sustainable Biomaterials (RSB), the 
Roundtable on Responsible Soy (RTRS), and Bonsucro (formerly known as the Better Sugarcane 
Initiative). These initiatives resemble each other in many, but display some interesting variation as 
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well. Notably, they differ in the way in which they use costly normative strategies to create legitimacy 
for their rules. Using the framework developed above, the following analysis tries to understand why.  
5.1 The Roundtable on Sustainable Biomaterials 
In November 2006, a group of stakeholders from industry and civil society, and government agencies 
met at a workshop at the École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne in Switzerland. The reason for the 
meeting was growing concern about biofuels and the industry’s environmental and social impact. At 
the meeting, a decision was made to develop an “internationally accepted and implementable standard 
for sustainable biofuels” (RSB, 2006, p. 1). This was the beginning of the RSB as a global standard-
setting and certification organization.  
How did the founders of the RSB try to create legitimacy for their rules? Using Quack’s distinction 
between strategies based on participation, expertise, and procedural fairness, the RSB put strong 
emphasis on the first. Its designers provided their organization with a highly participatory governance 
structure, which maintains a careful balance between industry and civil society interests as well as 
stakeholders from the global north and south. In the RSB, decision-making was organized in eleven 
stakeholder chambers (now part of the so-called Assembly of Delegates). The private sector was 
represented by four chambers and environmental and social groups by a further six. State actors and 
research institutions were given observer status in an eleventh chamber. In 2010, a decision was made 
to reduce the number of chambers from eleven to seven (three civil society chambers, three industry 
chambers, and the former chamber eleven). Standard-setting in the RSB was organized in four 
working groups (WGs). Participation in the WGs was free of charge and open to all interested parties. 
Overall, some 280 organizations and individuals participated in the work of WGs. The founders of the 
RSB also allowed for high level of external scrutiny. All their meeting minutes were made publicly 
available and, following the guidelines of the ISEAL alliance
2
, several outreach and consultation 
events were organized (Schleifer, 2014: 114-123). 
The second component of the RSB’s legitimation strategy was expert-based effectiveness. To this 
end, three expert groups on genetically modified organisms, greenhouse gases, and indirect impacts 
were formed in 2009 to complement the work of the WGs. Composed of RSB members and 
independent scientists and experts, the expert groups helped to define the technical details of the 
standard. In addition, in 2008, the RSB commissioned the Kluyver Centre for Genomics of Industrial 
Fermentation in Delft, Netherlands, to conduct an independent review of its standards (Schleifer, 
2014: 114-123). 
As the RSB evolved, it also used procedural fairness-based strategies to create legitimacy for its 
rules. In 2011, the RSB created a dispute resolution mechanism, which was revised and updated in 
2013. Under the reformed procedure any person or entity can file a complaint against the RSB, its 
members, or certified operators. The procedure clearly defines the requirements, processes, roles, 
responsibilities, as well as the time period in which complaints need to be resolved. While disputes 
shall be resolved at the lowest possible level (e.g., the certification body), ultimate decision-making 
authority rests with the Assembly of Delegates (EPFL, 2014, pp. 48-54).  
What explains these choices, in particular, the strong emphasis on costly participation-based 
strategies? Through the interviews and a background analysis of media and NGO reports, the highly 
politicized environment of the biofuels industry could be identified as an important factor. Launched 
in 2006, the formation of the RSB fell in a time of increasing controversy surrounding biofuels and the 
policies promoting it. While biofuels had long been praised as a green solution to problems with 
energy security, the dynamic of the debate started to shift as topics like competition with food, land 
grabs, and indirect land use change appeared on the agenda (e.g., Oxfam International, 2008). A main 
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 The ISEAL alliance is an umbrella organization of voluntary standard systems that defines standards of good practice. 
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driver was the global food crisis of 2007/2008. As prices for staple foods rose sharply in this period, 
many blamed biofuels as a main driver. The United Nations’ Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, 
Jean Ziegler, even went as far as calling them a “crime against humanity” (The Guardian, 2008).  
It was in this environment in which the founders of the RSB held their initial meetings. In light of 
the controversial nature of biofuels, legitimacy was a much discussed topic. The meeting minutes 
reveal how founders of the RSB were eager to avoid making mistakes that would compromise 
legitimacy at a later stage (RSB, 2006, p. 2). Interviews with members of the founding steering board 
lend support to the hypothesis that institutional pressures strongly influenced the choice of their 
legitimation strategy. In this regard, one members of this group explained: “in biofuels there was so 
much polemic and criticism. Take, for example, Jean Ziegler and his statements. The situation was so 
explosive and created the necessity of a broad process”.3 Another member described how “the 
complexity of biofuels made it necessary to have a range of different voices at the table. This was in a 
sense trying to get ahead of some of the criticism of biofuels by getting in place a framework that 
would diffuse concerns about the competition with food”.4  
Strong political pressures pushed the founders of the RSB to adopt a more participatory approach, 
as it was hoped that this would help them gain legitimacy in the highly contested environment of the 
biofuels sector. But the choice of legitimation strategies in the RSB cannot be fully understood without 
considering the role of learning. The initiators of the RSB had close connections to the FSC. They 
hired the former director of the forestry initiative as a consultant and he participated in their meetings 
from the very beginning. This facilitated a learning process between the two initiatives and the FSC 
became an important reference point and model for the RSB, as one interviewee explained: “the FSC 
clearly was a key driver for the RSB. We had many people with experience with the FSC who knew 
that this was a robust system that works.”5 
Finally, the case study revealed how the choice of legitimation strategies can become a political 
process as well. In 2009, the RSB was launched as a formal organization, with a governance structure 
consisting of eleven stakeholder chambers. It was also during this period in which the RSB’s 
membership base increased rapidly, with many producer organizations joining the initiative. Producers 
in the RSB soon felt that its governance structure gave too much influence to civil society actors. In 
particular, there were concerns that this would result in a standard too complex and costly to 
implement. What followed was an intense period of intergroup bargaining. On the one hand, producers 
argued that “[i]t will not be possible to sell the RSB to industry players when there are other lower 
cost options (…)” (RSB, 2010b, pp. 3-4). They believed that “there was a problem with representation 
of chambers in the RSB all along” and demanded significant changes (RSB, 2010a, p. 3). On the other 
hand, civil society rejected the reform proposals which they regarded “as a step backward for their 
constituencies returning to the ‘top-down’ approach, which denies the rights of small-scale and 
vulnerable stakeholders” (RSB, 2010c, p. 21). While this episode did not result in a major reversal of 
the RSB’s participation-based approach, it shows how intergroup bargaining can play a role in these 
decisions. 
5.2 The Roundtable on Responsible Soy 
The RTRS evolved out of the Forest Conversion Initiative of the World Wide Fund for Nature 
(WWF). In the early 2000s, the WWF-Switzerland began exploring the relationship between 
agriculture and forest conversion in the tropics. Because of its high expansion rate in Brazil and other 
South American countries, soybean farming was soon identified as a priority sector. In May 2004, 
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 Interview with a member of the RSB Founding Steering Board, London, December 2011. 
4
 Interview with a member of the RSB Founding Steering Board, via phone, December 2011. 
5
 Interview with a member of the RSB Founding Steering Board, via phone, November 2011. 
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participants from civil society, industry, and producer groups attended a workshop in London. At the 
meeting, it was decided to launch a multi-stakeholder process to develop a standard for sustainable soy 
production.  
Creating legitimacy through inclusiveness of participation was also the primary strategy of the 
founders of the RTRS, but some compromises were made. The result was a stronger position of 
industry actors and a less a participatory approach to standard-setting. The RTRS central decision-
making bodies (the Executive Board and the General Assembly) consist of three stakeholder 
chambers: 1) producers, 2) industry, trade and finance, and 3) civil society organizations. While 
industry actors outnumber civil society actor two to one, each chamber possesses a veto right. This 
means that no single interest group can dominate the process. Standard-setting in the RTRS was 
organized in the so-called Principles Criteria Verification Development Group (PCVDG). But unlike 
the RSB’s open approach, participation in the PCVDG was restricted. Each chamber could appoint 
nine experts to represent its interests in the PCVDG. In terms of enabling public scrutiny, there are 
few differences between the RSB and the RTRS. Detailed meeting minutes of the RTRS’ central 
decision-making bodies are made publicly available and several outreach and consultation events were 
organized (Schleifer, 2014: 152-163). 
The founders of the RTRS also used expert-based strategies. This was essential to make the RTRS 
standard workable (e.g., define technical indicators), but drawing on expert authority also served a 
legitimation function. Like in the RSB, expert knowledge played an important role in the standard-
setting process. One example is the creation of a so-called International Technical Group in 2010. 
Composed of external experts, but still reflecting the three chamber structure of the RTRS, the group 
reviewed the responsible soy standard and provided technical feedback to the PCVDG (Schleifer, 
2014: 152-163). 
While inclusiveness of participation and expert-based effectiveness constitute the RTRS’ primary 
legitimation strategies, more recently the scheme has also given attention to issues of procedural 
fairness. In 2011, a grievance procedure and, in 2013, a conflict resolution procedure were introduced. 
Through the grievance procedure members and non-members can submit a complaint against the 
RTRS, its members, as well as certified operators. All complaints or grievances are handled by a so-
called Grievance Committee. The committee decides on the legitimacy of the complaint and 
determines an appropriate course of action to address the grievance. The conflict resolution procedure, 
on the other hand, is a mechanism to solve internal conflict through the help of a so-called Mediation 
Committee. While requirements, processes, roles, and responsibilities are clearly defined in the RTRS 
dispute settlement procedures, the dominance of industry actors in the Grievance and Mediation 
Committees has been criticized as a weakness (EPFL, 2014, pp. 39-43). 
What explains the choice of legitimation strategies in this case? Like the RSB, the RTRS was 
subject to strong institutional pressures during its formation phase. Reports about soy expansion in 
connection with deforestation in the Amazon had attracted much attention from NGOs and the 
mainstream media. In addition, the widespread use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in the 
industry was a major issue with environmental NGOs.  
From the very beginning, the RTRS was at the centre of this criticism. In particular, the 
organization came under attack from civil society groups for its plans to certify GM soy under its 
scheme. Already, the first RTRS roundtable conference in 2005 in Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil, became a 
highly politicized event. Parallel to the roundtable meeting, GMO-critical NGOs held a counter-
conference. The second roundtable conference in August 2006 in Asunción, Paraguay, was 
accompanied by similar protests. A coalition of NGOs organized a protest march and published a 
declaration opposing the idea of “responsible soy”. Protest activities surrounded also the third and 
fourth RTRS roundtable conferences (e.g., ASEED, 2008). 
The interviews revealed that there was a general perception among the founding group that the 
controversy surrounding GM-soy made the sector a very difficult environment for launching a MSI. 
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One member of the founding group described how they were “sticking their head in anthill” and that it 
was a “really though environment”.6 Similar statements were made by other interviewees: “it was a 
much politicized environment. There was the GMO issue. It was very difficult to set up.” After the 
protests surrounding the first roundtable conference, there was much discussion among the members 
of the founding group and the feeling that they had underestimated the political nature of the issue.
7
  
When preparing the launch of the formal organization in 2006, the so-called Organizing Committee 
hired a consultancy firm to provide guidance. Its report reads: “who will be affected, who can affect 
the RSS [RTRS] and the level of impact are key guides in determining who should participate and to 
what extent. Because stakeholders are also those who oppose to an initiative, the higher the 
controversy around a project, the more SH [Stakeholders] must be closely involved with decision-
making” (Pi Environmental Consulting, 2005, p. 23). The interviews confirm that this was an 
important driver behind the choices made. It was hoped that emphasizing inclusiveness in the RTRS’s 
overall design would protect the organization from further criticism, as one interviewee explained: 
“we were under very close scrutiny from the NGOs because of the GMO issue. Everything we were 
doing was watched closely and we did not want to give them any further ammunition to criticise us on 
governance”.8  
As in the previous case, the FSC served the founders of the RTRS as an important reference in their 
discussions about institutional design. However, they soon realized that there were significant 
differences between the forestry and the soy product fields. While many forestry products are directly 
visible to the end consumer, soybeans are what one interviewee described as a “hidden commodity”. 
Only a very small percentage of global production is directly consumed by humans, whereas about 98 
percent of global production is used for animal feed. Because of this, it was reasoned that the 
consumer-oriented approach of the FSC was unsuitable for the RTRS. Instead, its founders opted for a 
so-called business-to-business approach, in which the certifier functions as an assurance mechanism 
between supply chain actors.
9
  
The decision to adopt a business-to-business approach had several implications. Firstly, it created 
the need to differentiate more clearly between firms occupying different positions in the agro supply 
chain. At a minimum, the business-to-business approach made it necessary to distinguish between 
corporate consumers and producers (in the FSC all industry actors were organized in one single 
stakeholder chamber). Secondly, it was reasoned that the business-to-business model would require 
more business ownership. On this topic, the report from Pi Environmental Consulting described “that a 
scheme designed for B2B [business-to-business] declarations will need less inclusiveness to be 
effective than a scheme designed to provide a consumer oriented label” (Pi Environmental Consulting, 
2005, pp. 4-5). Ultimately, with their design decisions, the founders of the RTRS sought to strike a 
balance between process efficiency and legitimacy as the following quote from the official project 
description reveals: “The viability of the RTRS is also dependent on its capacity to deliver its 
objectives, i.e. its effectiveness. With increased legitimacy, often the speed of the process is reduced. 
Somewhere in the middle, there is a combination of the two where the RTRS will be both inclusive 
and efficient” (RTRS, 2007, pp. 3-4). 
The within-case analysis also revealed several episodes of intergroup bargaining. Like in the RSB, 
producers groups and NGOs in the RTRS often held conflicting views on a wide range of issues. In 
this regard, one major conflict was about the scheme’s position on GMOs; another concerned the 
RTRS’ policy on deforestation. These episodes confirm that intergroup bargaining is an important 
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 Interview with a member of the RTRS Organizing Committee, via phone, May 2013. 
7
 Interview with a member of the RTRS Organizing Committee, via phone, May 2013. 
8
 Interview with the first President of the RTRS, via phone, May 2013. 
9
 Interview with a member of the RTRS Organizing Committee, via phone, May 2012.  
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mechanism of institutional choice in multi-stakeholder governance. However, in the case of the RTRS, 
no explicit bargaining over the choice of legitimation strategies was observed.  
5.3 Bonsucro (Better Sugarcane Initiative)  
According to the WWF, agriculture accounts for about 70 percent of all freshwater withdrawn for 
human use. In a series of studies and publications on the impact of agriculture on global water 
systems, a number of crops, among them sugarcane, were singled out as the world’s “thirstiest crops” 
(WWF, 2003). To mitigate the impact of global sugarcane production, the WWF reached out to Tate 
& Lyle, one of the world’s largest refiners of sugar, and together they organized a multi-stakeholder 
workshop in London. Held in June 2005, the Better Sugar Better Business Meeting became the 
founding event of Bonsucro (WWF, 2005).  
In comparison to the RSB and RTRS, Bonsucro is the least participatory of the three organizations. 
Formally, Bonsucro distinguishes between five stakeholder categories: 1) end users, 2) civil society, 3) 
farmers, 4) intermediaries, and 5) industrial. In practice, however, the scheme’s central decision-
making body (the Board of Directors) was dominated by a coalition of big brand companies and large 
northern NGOs from the very beginning. Civil society groups from the global south were not 
represented at all in this body and no veto mechanism was put in place to protect the organization from 
regulatory capture. Standard-setting in Bonsucro was organized in three Technical Working Groups 
(TWGs) on agronomy, processing and milling, and social impacts. Like in the RTRS, access to these 
bodies was restricted to a small group of experts. But unlike in the RTRS, there was no formal balance 
in the composition of the TWGs. Instead, all three TWG leaders had an industry background and only 
few NGOs participated in the standard-setting work. Later in the process, Bonsucro followed ISEAL 
guidelines and organized several outreach and consultation events. However, the scheme does not 
make its meeting minutes public, thus limiting the degree of external scrutiny (Schleifer, 2014: 188-
197).  
To compensate for this lack of inclusiveness, the founders of Bonsucro emphasized expert-based 
effectiveness in the overall design of their organization. This is exemplified by their objective to create 
a “science-based commodity discussion” (WWF, 2004). While the RSB, RTRS, and most other 
standard systems work with process standards (best practices), the founders of Bonsucro broke new 
ground by developing a metric-based system. Instead of defining best practices, the metric-based 
approach works with measurable impact indicators. At least in theory, this makes it possible to 
quantify impact reductions and thus to better demonstrate scientific rigour and effectiveness – 
although the interviews revealed that in some areas defining reliable indicators proved to be very 
difficult.
10
  
Since 2011, Bonsucro has also a formal complaint resolution process in place. Under the 
procedure, anyone can file a complaint against a Bonsucro member, the certification process, or 
Bonsucro as an organization. Complaints are handled by a complaint manager, who investigates the 
case and submits a report with recommendations to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Bonsucro. 
The CEO prepares a decision and presents it to the Board of Directors, which makes the final decision. 
In an assessment of dispute resolution and settlement for biomass certification schemes, Bonsucro’s 
complaint resolution process has been criticized for the fact that the CEO and the Board of Directors 
decide on a complaint: “They are not independent and this implies that there are potential conflicts of 
interests. In combination with the fact that the Board consists of more members representing 
company-interests in Bonsucro than the civil society there is a risk of being biased to favor the 
industry interests” (EPFL, 2014, p. 46). 
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What explains the mix of legitimation strategies in the case of Bonsucro, in particular, the emphasis 
of expert- over participation-based strategies? The previous two case studies identified strong political 
pressures as a factor pushing the founders of the RSB and the RTRS to adopt participation-based 
strategies. In comparison, these pressures were found to be much weaker in the sugarcane sector. In 
the past, there has been some NGO criticism of poor working conditions in the industry (Amnesty 
International, 2008). However, no major NGO campaigns were underway during the formation phase 
of Bonsucro. The situation somewhat changed when sugarcane became a feedstock for the world’s 
growing demand for biofuels. As a result, the industry was increasingly associated with the 
controversial topics of the biofuels debate (Friends of the Earth, 2010). However, Bonsucro was 
created as a food crop initiative, and only later did it enter the biofuels certification market.
11
 A 
background research on media coverage and NGO reports confirmed the low level of political pressure 
during the organization’s formation phase. It produced only one report of the European Corporate 
Observatory in which the “little known Better Sugarcane Initiative” was critically mentioned 
(Corporate Europe Observatory, 2008). Thus, in comparison to the RSB and the RTRS, Bonsucro was 
“sailing in calm waters” as one of the interviewees put it.12 
However, the choice of legitimation strategies in Bonsucro cannot be fully understood without 
considering the preferences of institutional entrepreneurs. While Bonsucro, like the RTRS, was an 
initiative of the WWF, the two roundtables were initiated by different national organizations of the 
WWF network. In the case of the RTRS, the WWF Switzerland was the main driver; in the case of 
Bonsucro, it was the WWF United States. In the world of the WWF, a highly decentralized network 
organization, the two country chapters occupy different ends of the political spectrum. As explained 
by one WWF official, the United States chapter is known for its strong ties to big business and large 
corporate foundations, whereas the Swiss country chapter is considered more left-wing and more 
“grass roots” in its orientation.13  
The within-case analysis revealed how the WWF United States had a strong influence on the 
institutional trajectory of Bonsucro, pushing it to adopt a more managerial and science-based 
approach. After the founding workshop was held in London, a so-called Steering Committee was 
formed to initiate the standard-setting process and to develop the organizational structures of 
Bonsucro. Central to the decisions of this group was a senior official of the WWF United States. As 
described by one of the interviewees, “[person X] had very clear ideas how to do this and he wrote a 
paper about the principles that we should use to set up this kind of initiative.”14 In the memo to the 
founding group, the official criticized the open and deliberative approach of previous roundtables 
initiatives: “While talk, discussion, or even consensus may be a means to an end, they are not a 
sufficient end in and of themselves to be worthy of WWF’s time. The goals need to be agreed to 
before the first meeting” (WWF, 2004, p. 1).  
With regard to stakeholder inclusion, the memo instructed the founding group to identify the “key 
leverage points for change” of the agro supply chain. The process should be driven by “the players that 
bring sustained interest in the commodity to the table, and that bring considerable financial resources 
to the work of the group as well” (WWF, 2004, pp. 3-4). On the corporate side, these are buyers and 
traders as well as banks. These companies, which transact with large numbers of producers, can induce 
environmental change by making their buying decisions and loans conditional on standard 
compliance. In contrast, the memo warned not to involve producer or manufacturer associations early 
on in the process, which it identified as the most conservative members of the agro supply chain. Civil 
society organizations should also be selected using criteria such as their level of commitment and 
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 Interview with a member of the Steering Committee, via phone, May 2012.  
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expertise. The memo makes clear that there are many different stakeholders (NGOs and companies) 
that should not be “invited to the table”, because of a lack of expertise, commitment, or ideological 
opposition: “Wanting to be at the table is an insufficient reason to be there”. In this context, the WWF 
official identified the politicization of the rule-making process as one of the main problems of 
previous roundtable initiatives. Instead, he promoted the idea of a “science-based commodity 
discussion”, in which legitimacy is created through using science to build consensus among 
stakeholders (WWF, 2004, pp. 2-6). 
As in the previous cases, the within-case analysis revealed several episodes of intergroup 
bargaining between business and civil society actors in Bonsucro. However, intergroup bargaining was 
found to be less intense when compared to the RSB and RTRS. A plausible explanation for this is that 
the level of politicization was lower in the sugarcane sector and that the members of Bonsucro were a 
more homogenous group from the start.  
5.4 Summary of results 
The case studies revealed how the RSB, RTRS, and Bonsucro differ in their choice of legitimation 
strategies. While participation-based strategies were deployed by all three organizations, they did so to 
different degrees. Inclusiveness of participation was high in the RSB, somewhat restricted in the 
RTRS, and strongly restricted in Bonsucro. On the other hand, Bonsucro put more emphasis on the use 
of expert-based effectiveness in its overall design – clearly a less costly legitimation strategy than true 
interest participation. With regard to procedural fairness-based strategies, it was found that they played 
only a secondary role in the cases studied. They were deployed as the organizations were more mature 
and developed, suggesting a sequence in the use of legitimation strategies in private governance. 
While some differences in the design of dispute settlement mechanisms were observed, the critical 
difference was the composition (inclusiveness) of the bodies in charge of making the arbitration 
decisions.  
Using the framework developed above, differences in the strength of coercive institutional 
pressures were identified as an important explanatory factor. These pressures were strong in the 
biofuels and soy arenas, whereas the sugarcane sector was a much less politicized environment. The 
within-case analysis revealed how this had important implications for the choice of legitimation 
strategies in the three organizations. Under intense scrutiny from critical stakeholders, the founders of 
the RSB and RTRS reasoned that increasing the “fit” with widely accepted norms of democratic 
governance would protect their organizations and help them gain legitimacy in these arenas. In 
contrast, in the low conflict environment of the sugarcane sector, the founders of Bonsucro were not 
exposed to the same pressures and therefore felt less need to invest in costly legitimation strategies.  
But the case studies also showed that the choice of legitimation strategies in private governance is 
not simply a function of external pressures. Factors that are internal to these arrangements are also 
important. In this context, two mechanisms were explored: institutional entrepreneurs and intergroup 
bargaining. In particular, institutional entrepreneurs were found to play an important role in the design 
phase of three MSIs. Consequently, their preferences mattered for the institutional pathways these 
organizations took. While institutional entrepreneurs responded to political pressures in their 
environments, they also had ideas and preferences that were not context-specific. These preferences 
were rooted in their material interests, worldviews, and the lessons they drew from their experiences 
and the experiences of others. In this regard, the case studies showed how the founders of the three 
organizations held different believes about multi-stakeholder governance. This came out most clearly 
in the case of Bonsucro. From the beginning, the founders of Bonsucro had the idea of a science-based 
and less political organization.  
The third mechanism of institutional choice was intergroup bargaining. Several episodes of 
bargaining could be observed in the three cases studied, in particular, in the RSB. The conflict lines 
often ran between civil society and industry actors. However, in most episodes, the stringency of the 
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standard was the focal point of bargaining, not the choice of legitimation strategies. Only in the RSB 
there was a prolonged sequence of intergroup bargaining about the inclusiveness and distribution of 
decision-making power in the organization. However, this episode of intergroup bargaining only 
occurred at a later stage of organizational development, when initial institutional design choices had 
already been taken. This suggests two things: first, inclusive and heterogeneous organizations like the 
RSB are more prone to intergroup bargaining than less inclusive ones. Second, intergroup bargaining 
can play a role in these decisions, but it is not the primary mechanism of institutional choice.  
6. Conclusion  
The growing importance of private governance in the global economy has raised pressing questions 
about its legitimacy. The academic literature on the topic is largely divided into two camps: one 
normative, the other empirical. While works in the normative tradition (e.g., Dingwerth, 2007; 
Bäckstrand and Khan and Kronsell and Lövbrand, 2010) theorize and evaluate private governance and 
its right to rule, empirically oriented scholars (e.g., Cashore, 2002; Bernstein, 2011; Bexell, 2014) 
study why and when non-state institutions are believed to have the right to rule. Following Quack 
(2010), this article cut across this divide, by explaining the choice of normative legitimation strategies 
in field of transnational non-state governance. It was shown how even MSIs – often referred to as the 
gold standard of private governance – vary significantly in the way they use participation, expert-
based effectiveness, and procedural fairness to create legitimacy for their rules. Because true interest 
representation involves costly trade-offs with efficiency and control, variation was found to be 
particularly strong in the area of inclusiveness of participation.  
While some progress has been made in explaining the institutional design of private governance, 
the underlying causal mechanisms and now they interact are not yet fully understood. Existing works 
have mostly focused on single mechanisms, either studying the effects of institutional pressures (e.g., 
Dingwerth and Pattberg, 2009) or factors that are internal to these arrangements (e.g., Conzelmann, 
2012). In contrast, analyses that systematically combine the two have been missing. To fill this gap, 
this article reviewed existing explanations and integrated them into a common framework of 
institutional choice. Put to work in three in-depth case studies, it was shown how institutional 
entrepreneurs respond to political pressures, but that their design choices are not fully determined by 
them. Worldviews, material preferences, and learning matter as well in these decisions. In addition, it 
was found how decisions about legitimation strategies can become the focal point of intergroup 
bargaining, although it was not the primary mechanism of institutional choice in the cases studied.  
Situated in the broader debate about the legitimacy of transnational private governance, this article 
adopted the empirical approach of legitimation research to explain variation in the choice of normative 
strategies. It made an important contribution to this cross-cutting perspective by delineating and 
empirically examining the causal mechanisms underlying these decisions. Future research on the 
legitimacy non-state governance should continue on this path. Given the growing supply and demand 
for private rules in the global economy, understanding the complex dynamics that lead to normatively 
more or less desirable outcomes is an important task.  
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